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the enforcement of the penal law of the state, or shall some other
means of formally accusing those charged with crime be
found? The question has received considerable attention
and arguments have been offered on both sides. It is my
opinion that neither public policy nor expediency nor any
other reason appears why the Grand Jury should not be
allowed to continue to exercise the powers it now possesses.
The Grand Jury has served the public in the past, and served
it efficiently and practically. It is my belief that to uproot
it and supplant it with some other agency or instrumentality
to inquire into crimes and to ascertain their perpetrators
would be to take a step fraught with danger.
Innovations in the administration of the procedure to
enforce the penal law are not to be encouraged except where
they are palpably in the interest of the People of the state.
Those charged with crime are amply safeguarded under the
existing practice. There are milestones along the course of the
presentation, trial and appeal of a criminal case where the
defendant's rights are superior to those of the People. Efforts
to equalize the positions of the parties, or at least to remove
some of the handicaps attaching to the People's presentation
of their case, have failed. That being so, the People should
well look to the safeguarding of the powers they now possess
rather than to indulge in experiments in practice and procedure which, when put to the critical test, may leave them
shorn of some of the few advantages they now hold in their
contest with the criminal, and especially the resourceful
criminal, or, more to the point, the criminal who has it in his
power and means to employ resourceful counsel.
More than ever before we are living in a work-a-day
world. Work pressure is terrific. Volumes of business have
to be disposed of, compared to which the daily routine of
years ago appears trifling. This is as true of the successful
law office, or the office of a district attorney, or of a cor-
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poration counsel, or of a justice of the Supreme Court, as it
is of organized industry. There is this difference, so far as
a public prosecutor is concerned: despatch is of the very
essence of his duties; prosecutions cannot be permitted to lag
needlessly; they may not be permitted to become stale; they
must be disposed of while the interest of all concerned remains unflagged. In the light of this viewpoint, it would be
detrimental to the administration of the penal law to permit
the machinery for its enforcement at this time to undergo
change, which may or may not prove beneficial to the interest
of the People of the state, when the machinery already set
up functions properly and in the interest of all concerned.
When I use the expression "all concerned," I use it advisedly,
as including the interest of the People and of the defendant
in a criminal case as well. There is a common notion that a
Grand Jury is a fearsome body which spends its time inquiring into the business of everybody else, without any other
object than to see to it that it fastens a crime upon whomever
its whim selects as its victim. Of course, this is not so. The
Grand Jury's duties are circumscribed, and it must act
within them.' Whenever it oversteps its legal limits the
courts are here to protect those whom it would improperly
and unjustifiably impugn. So, far from peregrinating about
seeking out whom it may impale, the Grand Jury conducts
its proceedings in an orderly manner, according to a standardized method. Principally and primarily, it inquires into
crimes for which defendants have been held by the action of
committing magistrates charged with the duty of determining, in the first instance, whether accused persons brought
before them are, in their opinion, guilty of the offenses with
which they have been charged.2 The Grand Jury may also
take cognizance of a criminal charge on its own motion. 3 It
usually does so upon the intervention of the district attorney.
A magistrate, that is to say, may not have held a defendant
for the action of the Grand Jury. The district attorney believes, notwithstanding the determination of the magistrate,
that a crime has been committed and that the person accused
'Code Criminal Procedure, Sec. 255.
2
Ibid. Sec. 221.
'Ibid. Sec. 259.
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is guilty. The district attorney may initiate an inquiry by
the Grand Jury,4 and the Grand Jury may indict.5
The Grand Jury is an ancient body. Its origin and its
functions are of historical interest. Justice Field has said: 6
"The institution of the Grand Jury is of very ancient origin in the history of England-it goes back
many centuries. For a long period its powers were
not clearly defined; and it would seem from the accounts of commentators on the laws of that country
that it was at first a body which not only accused, but
which also tried, public offenders. However this may
have been in its origin, it was at the time of the settlement of this country an informing and accusing tribunal only, without whose previous action no person
charged with a felony could, except in certain special
cases, be put upon his trial. And in the struggles
which at times arose in England between the powers
of the King and the rights of the subject, it often
stood as a barrier against persecution in his name;
until, at length, it came to be regarded as an institution by which the subject was rendered secure against
oppression from unfounded prosecutions of the Crown.
In this country, from the popular character of our
institutions, there has seldom been any contest between the government and the citizen which required
the existence of the Grand Jury as a protection
against oppressive action of the government. Yet the
institution was adopted in this country, and is continued from considerations similar to those which give
to it its chief value in England, and is designed as a
means, not only of bringing to trial persons accused
of public offenses upon just grounds, but also as a
means of protecting the citizen against unfounded
accusation, whether it come from government, or be
prompted by partisan passion or private enmity. No
person shall be required, according to the fundamen'People v. Dillon, 197 N. Y. 254, 90 N. E. 820 (1910).
rIbid.
6 Charges to the Grand Jury, 2 Sawyer (U. S.) 7, 668 (1872).
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tal law of the country, except in the cases mentioned,
to answer for any of the higher crimes unless this
body, consisting of not less than sixteen nor more
than twenty-three good and lawful men, selected from
the body of the district, shall declare upon careful
deliberation, under the solemnity of an oath, that there
is good reason for his accusation and trial."
Another learned jurist 7 many years ago said of the
proposal now made to substitute for the Grand Jury some
other agency of government:
"It has been said that, since there is no danger
to the citizen from the oppressions of a monarch, or
of any form of executive power, there is no longer
need of a Grand Jury. But, whatever force may be
given to this argument, it remains true that the Grand
Jury is as valuable as ever in securing, in the language of.Chief Justice Shaw (in the case of Jones v.
Robbins, 8 Gray, 329), 'individual citizens from an
open and public accusation of crime, and from the
trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial before
a probable cause is established by the presentment and
*indictment of such a jury; and in case of high offenses
it is justly regarded as one of the securities to the
innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive public prosecutions.'"
The Grand Jury's findings are not conclusive upon a
defendant whom it charges with a crime.' He may at once
move for an inspection of the Grand Jury's minutes and, if
the motion is granted, he may move, upon the minutes, for a
dismissal of the indictment. The right to a dismissal, it has
been held, if the evidence before the Grand Jury was insufficient to warrant the indictment, is inherent, and may not
be impinged upon by the legislature. 1° Therefore, the notion
Mr. Justice Miller.
Ex parte Bain, 121 U. S. 1, 12 (1886).
Supra note 1 at Sec. 952t.
"0People v. Glen, 173 N. Y. 395, 66 N. E. 112 (1903) ; People v. Sexton,
187 N. Y. 495, 80 N. E. 396 (1907).
8
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generally held that a defendant must answer to an indictment by the Grand Jury is without basis. The defendant
may move in attack of the indictment at its very inception
and if he succeeds he is not, of course, compelled to stand
trial. Formerly, so secure was the position of a defendant
in a criminal case against an unjust or unwarranted indictment that the People had no appeal from the decision of the
court dismissing an indictment. The People now, by force
of one of the amendments known as the Baumes Laws,"' have
the right of appeal.
It is to be seen, therefore, that so far from being an
agency of oppression or unjust attack, the Grand Jury may
not improperly indict a defendant, inasmuch as its action in
any case is subject to the close supervision and examination
of the courts.
What useful purpose can be served by supplanting this
body, in the light of the few comments I have just made?
None, that I can see. On the other hand, if the practice
suggested, of having the district attorney proceed by information before a magistrate, were adopted, interminable delays might result from the time of the filing of the information until the determination of the cause. There is no reason
why, in every case, a defendant should be placed in possession of the evidence of the people, as he would be under such
a practice.
Perhaps there have been instances where persons have
been unjustly accused by the Grand Jury, but they have
always had a remedy against unfounded accusation, and the
courts have been always ready to enforce that remedy. It
seems to me that under the practice now prevailing, a surer
equilibrium is preserved between the People and the defendant in a criminal case than would be likely to follow any
change in the ancient system which is in vogue.
CHARLES
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